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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present lawsuit arose out of an automobile/ 
pedestrian accident that occurred on April 16, 1982, and 
resulted in the death of the plaintiffs1 8 year old son, David 
Johnson. The driver of the vehicle, defendant Donald Rogers, 
was intoxicated at the time of the accident, although he was 
engaged in an employment related activity and was driving a 
vehicle owned by his employer, Newspaper Agency Corporation 
(hereinafter "NAC"). Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against both 
Rogers and NAC, seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
against each of them. 
On December 10, 1984, NAC moved for partial summary 
judgment as to its liability to the plaintiffs for punitive 
damages. Plaintiffs responded, claiming both that NAC had 
independently exhibited a reckless disregard for the rights and 
safety of plaintiffs and others, and that, under the facts 
shown, NAC was also vicariously liable for punitive damages on 
the basis of defendant Rogers' conduct. A hearing was held on 
this motion on February 8, 1985 before the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier. On March 25, 1985, Judge Fishier issued a Memorandum 
Decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, 
granting NAC's motion on the basis of his holding that proof of 
actual malice, defined as "intent to injure," is necessary to a 
cause of action for punitive damages, and that there can be no 
vicarious liability for punitive damages in Utah. Finding no 
_i-
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actual malice on the part of NAC's managerial employees, the 
Court ruled that NAC was not liable to the plaintiffs for puni-
tive damages. 
On the basis of this ruling, defendant Donald Rogers 
immediately moved for summary judgment as to his liability for 
punitive damages as well. Plaintiffs moved the Court for 
reconsideration of its decision. A hearing was held before 
Judge Fishier on Monday, April 1st, at which both the plain-
tiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and Donald Rogers' Motion for 
Summary Judgment were argued. On April 3, 1935, Judge Fishier 
denied plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and granted 
defendant Rogers' Motion for Summary Judgment as to his 
liability for punitive damages. A Partial Summary Judgment to 
that effect was signed by Judge Fishier on April 5, 1985, which 
document is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
On April 4, 1985, defendants Rogers and NAC filed an 
Admission, admitting generally that defendant Donald Rogers was 
negligent, that Rogers' negligence was the proximate cause of 
the plaintiffs' damages, and that Rogers was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment at the time of the acci-
dent. Plaintiffs moved for a stay of the April 9, 1985 trial 
date in order to appeal Judge Fishler's decision, which motion 
was granted by Judge Fishier on April 5, 1985. On April 25, 
1985, plaintiffs filed a petition for permission to appeal 
Judge Fishler's rulings with this Court. That petition was 
granted on May 10, 1985. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 16, 1982, at approximately 10:00 o'clock 
p.m., as Ray Johnson and his 8 year old son, David, were 
standing on the northwest corner of the intersection of Second 
South and Main Streets in Salt Lake City waiting for a "walk" 
signal, a red Toyota pickup truck, proceeding westbound on 
Second South, crossed the intersection, jumped over the curb on 
the northwest corner, and struck David Johnson as he was stand-
ing on the sidewalk. David Johnson was carried by the truck 
into a construction barricade, and was pinned under the truck's 
right front tire, which was where his father found him. He was 
unconscious, and was pronounced dead on arrival at LDS 
Hospital. Ray Johnson was also injured when he was struck in 
the accident, either by the truck or by one of several concrete 
pillars that were struck and thrown by the truck as it came 
onto the sidewalk. (R. Johnson, 11/1/82, pp. 6-19). In 
addition, Ray Johnson suffered severe shock and other serious 
emotional trauma as a result of these events. 
1This citation refers to the deposition transcript of 
plaintiff Ray Johnson, dated November 1, 1982, at pages 6 
through 19. All further references to the depositions that 
have been taken in this action will be similarly abbreviated to 
the deponent's last name and the page on which the information 
is given. Where a witness has been deposed two or more times, 
the date of the deposition will be given as well. 
-3-
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The truck that struck David Johnson was owned by 
Newspaper Agency Corporation and was operated at the time of 
the accident by Donald Rogers, an NAC employee, who was acting ^ 
within the course and scope of his employment at the time. 
(NAC's Answer to Amended Complaint, 11 2; Admission, dated 
4/3/85). In the hours immediately preceding the accident, ^ 
Rogers had been out drinking at a bar with friends, and had 
consumed, according to his own testimony, approximately 7 mixed 
drinks consisting of vodka and orange juice. (Rogers, 11/1/82, ^ 
pp. 39-40). Rogers also "chug-a-lugged" a mixture known as a 
"Raging Bull," a 27 ounce drink containing 2 mini bottles of 
Tequila. (Kitchens, 10/3/84, pp. 24-25, 32-33; Between | 
Friends1 Answer to Interr. No. 28). At the time of the acci-
dent, his blood alcohol content was .18%. This was not, 
however, the first time that Donald Rogers had driven a vehicle | 
while intoxicated. 
Donald Rogers was employed by NAC as a driver, and his 
principal duty on the evening of April 16, 1982 was to pick up 4 
newspapers from NAC's dock area and to deliver them to Park 
City. (Rogers, 11/1/82, pp. 24, 41, 55) Rogers had left the 
bar at approximately 9:00 p.m., reported to work at approxi- 4 
mately 9:30 p.m. and obtained the vehicle from the NAC garage. 
(Rogers, 11/1/82, pp. 40-41; Kitchens, 3/4/85, pp. 10-11) 
Prior to his hiring by NAC in 1980, Rogers had been convicted 
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in Oregon for driving under the influence, (Rogers, 10/3/84, 
p. 18, 11/1/82, p. 14). However, although NAC purportedly ran 
periodic driver's license checks on its drivers, it was 
apparently unaware of Rogers' previous conviction, and was also 
unaware that two of its other drivers had their licenses 
suspended while they were driving for NAC, and that those 
employees had simply continued to drive on suspended licenses. 
(Moyer, p. 10; Jacobson, pp. 6-7). 
Rogers admitted that for a period of at least six 
months to one year prior to the accident he was a "heavy" or 
"problem" drinker, (Rogers,' 10/3/84, p. 12). In addition, 
both Rogers and his co-employees testified that he made no real 
effort to hide his drinking habits from anyone. (Rogers, 
10/3/84, p. 20; Mann, 7/31/84, p. 32; Moyer, p. 48). In fact, 
according to a number of NAC employees and ex-employees, Donald 
Rogers frequently came to work intoxicated, openly consumed 
alcohol while he was at work, and periodically took alcohol 
with him in company vehicles when he made delivery runs. 
(Moyer, pp. 8, 14-15, 48; Kitchens, 10/3/84, pp. 11-12, 22; 
Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 26-27, 32). He also usually kept alcohol in 
his personal vehicle, which fact was observed by other NAC 
employees when Rogers parked his vehicle at the loading dock. 
(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 26-27; Rogers, 10/3/84, p. 29). Finally, 
Rogers testified that he also regularly smoked marijuana with 
-5-
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other NAC employees while they were on duty. (Rogers, 10/3/84, 
pp. 30-31). Nonetheless, Don Rogers had been able to obtain a 
company vehicle on April 16 as a matter of course. ^ 
Several other witnesses, who were co-employees of 
Rogers, testified that they too frequently consumed both mari-
juana and alcohol while they were on duty. (Cowley, pp. 23-24; ^ 
Kitchens, 10/31/84, pp. 16-17; Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 30, 41-42; 
Moyer, pp. 20-21; Jacobson, p. 28.). Moreover, most of the NAC 
night shift employees were young, and their work and social A 
lives would frequently overlap. For example, groups of 
employees and non-employees would periodically ride with NAC 
drivers on their runs, usually to Tooele or Evanston. These * 
outings were treated as a traveling party, and the group 
consumed alcohol on the way to and from their destination. 
(Christensen, pp. 48-49; Jacobson, pp. 35-38; Mann, 7/31/84, * 
pp. 44-46). On at least two occasions, the result was that the 
company vehicles ended up off the highway in the snow. 
(Jacobson, pp. 35-38). In addition, a number of NAC employees j 
also regularly went as a group to hockey games, which ended 
immediately before they were to report to work, and beer and 
other alcohol was consumed by the employees at the games. j 
(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 22-24; Moyer, p. 9). 
NAC's employees did not take great pains to hide the 
evidence of their outings, as was shown by the testimony of an g 
-6-
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employee who worked at the NAC garage and was assigned to 
supervise NAC vehicles. That employee stated that he 
frequently found beer cans in the vehicles after they were 
returned from runs, and that at least one of the garage super-
visors knew that the vehicles were sometimes returned with beer 
cans in them, (Christensen, p. 47). However, there was even 
more significant evidence of NAC's knowledge of these practices. 
One NAC driver testified that his supervisor, Terry 
Northrup, had once caught him and another driver smoking 
marijuana on NAC premises and told them to "do it on the 
road." (Jacobson, pp. 21-22). In addition, Mr. Northrup had 
once had a party for NAC employees at his home at which both 
marijuana and a mixture of various alcohols and fruit juice 
(referred to in the testimony as "jungle juice") were consumed, 
despite the fact that at least some of the employees that were 
at that party were expected to report to work that evening. 
(Jacobson, pp. 23-24, 26). Finally, Mr. Northrup also came 
into the NAC dock area one evening to check on the employees, 
himself so apparently intoxicated that those employees testi-
fied that he slurred his speech and almost wrecked the motor-
cycle on which he was riding. (Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 34-40; 
Jacobson, p. 23; Moyer, pp. 51-53). Nonetheless, Mr. Northrup 
was apparently not alone among the supervisors in engaging in 
this type of conduct. For example, a garage employee testified 
-7-
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that he once discovered his two supervisors drinking beverages 
while they were working at the garage at night, and he had 
assumed they were drinking alcohol by the smell and the 
presence of mini-bottles in the office. (Cowley, pp. 20-21). 
In addition, the employees that participated in drink-
ing and drug usage testified that it would not have been very 
difficult for NAC management to have discovered such conduct if 
they had made any effort to do so, and a number of those 
employees testified that, in fact, they believed that NAC 
management did know of those practices. (Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 
88-89; Kitchens, 10/3/84, p. 19; Jacobson, pp. 31-32, 47). 
Furthermore, even some of the employees that did not partici-
pate in drinking or drug usage at work stated that those 
practices were the subject of regular "office gossip," and were 
essentially common knowledge. (Gierloff, pp. 24-28). 
Although most of the employees testified that they 
knew that their conduct was against the rules, this knowledge 
was due more to common sense than to the existence of any 
company policy. (Christensen, p. 34; Moyer, pp. 33-34). 
Moreover, most employees testified that they were unaware of 
any company policy that related to consumption of drugs or 
alcohol immediately before they reported to work, and that 
there was no enforcement of the company policy against drinking 
and drug usage while at work. (Mann, 7/31/84, p. 88; Moyer, 
p. 28; Cowley, pp. 25-26; Christensen, p. 41). 
-8-
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This practice of acquiescence by management was 
especially evident on the night shift. There was virtually no 
supervision of employees on that shift, since the state driver 
supervisor, Terry Northrup, primarily worked days and only came 
in at night approximately once a month. (Mannf 7/31/84, 
p. 18). No employee that worked nights, either at the dock or 
at the garage, had any authority or apparent authority over the 
night drivers. (Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 42-43). In fact, most 
employees testified that they had no authority to prevent a 
driver from taking an NAC vehicle even if he was intoxicated. 
(Moyer, pp. 17, 23; Christensen, pp. 41-42; Cowley, p. 23). 
Thus, prior to the accident, there was no vehicle check-out 
system at NAC, and drivers were allowed to simply obtain keys 
from a rack in the garage and take the vehicles. (Christensen, 
p. 43; Jacobson, p. 29; Moyer, pp. 22-23; Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 
36-37). 
NAC took such conduct by its employees fairly 
casually. For example, on one occasion, after a driver was 
reported to management for failure to return a company vehicle, 
he was discovered either asleep or passed out in the vehicle 
where it was parked at a bowling alley that had a bar. 
(Christensen, p. 39). The employee who had reported the driver 
testified that he felt the punishment that was received for 
such conduct was ridiculously lenient. (Christensen, p. 40). 
-9-
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i 
Moreover, despite this and the many other violations of 
•company policy," most employees were unaware of any serious 
punishment for drinking or drug usage that had ever been dealt j 
out by the management. (Mann, 7/31/84, p. 35). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is actual malice (or intent to injure) required 4 
before punitive damages may be assessed in Utah? 
2. Can there be vicarious liability for punitive 
damages in Utah, and if so, on what showing? 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants contend that punitive damages may be 
imposed in an action for personal injury and wrongful death 4 
where a defendant acted with "reckless indifference" to the 
rights and safety of others. Plaintiffs need not prove the 
existence of "actual malice" or "intent to injure" in order to | 
recover punitive damages in such cases. In this case, there is 
sufficient evidence to have created an issue of fact with 
respect to the existence of independent reckless indifference 4 
by each of the defendants, and summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants as to their liability for punitive damages was 
therefore improper. | 
In addition, appellants contend that defendant NAC may 
also be held vicariously liable for punitive damages based upon 
the conduct of defendant Rogers, its agent, even if the evi- f 
dence is found insufficient to support a claim of independent 
-10-
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reckless indifference by NAC. Appellants contend that there is 
an issue of fact created under any of the three most commonly 
accepted theories of vicarious liability for punitive damages, 
and Judge Fishier's rejection of the concept of vicarious 
liability for punitive damages in its entirety was error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE ASSESSED IN 
UTAH WHERE THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT 
EXHIBITS A "RECKLESS INDIFFERENCE" 
TOWARDS THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. 
Judge Fishier, following a number of other Third 
District judges, has ruled in this case that the standard for 
imposition of punitive damages in Utah is "actual malice," 
which he has defined as "intent to injure." The stated basis 
for Judge Fishler's ruling is the case of McFarland v. Skaggs 
Companies, Inc. , 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), in which this Court 
overruled that portion of Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), which had adopted a 
"malice in law" standard for false imprisonment cases. The 
Terry decision had held that punitive damages could be assessed 
against a defendant shopkeeper in a false imprisonment case on 
the basis of "implied malice" or "malice in law." Signifi-
cantly, the Terry court held that malice would be implied in a 
false imprisonment case whenever the shopkeeper had made an 
arrest without probable cause to do so, and that the defendant 
had the burden of proving the existence of probable cause. 
-11-
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The McFarland court found the implication of malice 
that had been approved by Terry to be an unacceptable tipping 
of the delicate balance of interests involved in shoplifting j 
cases, and held that malice could not be implied in such cases 
merely from an absence of probable cause. Thus, the McFarland 
court held that "the appropriate standard for determining the 4 
availability of a punitive damages award in an action for false 
imprisonment [is] that of 'malice in fact1 or 'actual malice1" 
(emphasis added). 678 P.2d at 304. I 
Significantly, the McFarland court expressly limited 
its holding to false imprisonment cases after engaging in a 
lengthy discussion of the unique interests which those cases | 
involve. The court did not say, as Judge Fishier has inter-
preted the decision, that, by its adoption of an "actual 
malice" standard, it was overruling the reckless indifference 4 
standard for assessment of punitive damages which previously 
had been applied in numerous non-false imprisonment cases. For 
example, in 1982, the Utah Supreme Court held generally that f 
"punitive damages may be awarded when one acts with reckless 
indifference and disregard of the law and his fellow 
citizens." Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 4 
277 (Utah 1982). Branch involved a landowner's strict 
liability for nuisance, in which it was found that there was 
insufficient evidence to support a cause of action for negli- § 
gence. Likewise, in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Company v. 
-12-
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Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that punitive damages are appropriate where the conduct 
complained of was the result of reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, the rights of others. Finally, in Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), which 
was decided only six weeks prior to McFarland, this Court again 
applied the reckless indifference standard, this time to a 
wrongful death action involving a claim that the defendant 
hospital had failed to prevent a patient from committing 
suicide. The standard for imposition of punitive damages was 
described as follows: 
Our cases have generally held that punitive 
damages may be awarded only on proof of 
"willful and malicious" conduct, or on proof 
of conduct which manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and disregard 
of, the rights of others, especially where 
compensatory damages may be simply absorbed 
as a cost of doing business. 
• * * 
A defendant's conduct must be malicious or 
in reckless disregard for the rights of 
others, although actual intent to cause 
injury is not necessary. That is, the 
defendant must either know or should know 
"that such conduct would, in a high degree 
of probability, result in substantial harm 
to another," and the conduct must be "highly 
unreasonable conduct, or an extreme 
departure from ordinary care, in a situation 
where a high degree of danger is apparent." 
(Citations omitted; emphasis added). 
675 P.2d at 1186-87. 
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Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Judge Fishier has 
read far more into McFarland than this Court either intended or 
expressed. As such, a thoughtful policy meant to protect the 
vigilant store owner has now been stretched to give unique 
protection to the drunk. Drunk driving and its grisly sequela 
are costly and tragic social problems. The classic defense 
approach to these cases is for the defendant ultimately to 
admit liability and to try to keep evidence of the defendant's 
intoxication from the jury on grounds of relevance. Jones v. 
Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982), is a blueprint for this 
defense strategy. NAC has used the same approach here by 
pleading such disingenuous defenses as assumption of risk 
(which is no longer available in Utah) and comparative negli-
gence (which is difficult to see in an 8 year old whose biggest 
fault appears to have been not anticipating that drunks could 
be driving their trucks onto the sidewalk), and then "condi-
tionally" admitting liability once Judge Fishier had taken 
punitive damages out of the case. But for this appeal, the 
defendants would have wanted to try this case solely on the 
issue of compensatory damages, without allowing the jury to 
know the facts. 
In the proper case, punitive damage issues will allow 
the full unexpurgated story to go to the jury. This is the 
proper case. Almost all jurisdictions which have considered 
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the question have ruled that punitive damages should be avail-
able in the context of drunk driving. In this regard, plain-
tiffs submitted summaries of some 32 jurisdictions which have 
considered the availability of punitive damages against drunk 
drivers, in connection with their motion for reconsideration of 
Judge Fishler's decision. Of those jurisdictions, 26 have 
ruled that punitive damages are available against drunk 
drivers, 3 jurisdictions have disallowed punitive damages, and 
cases from 3 other jurisdictions are either unclear on the 
point or are in conflict. See Appendix A to plaintiffs1 Memo-
randum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and plaintiffs1 
Supplement to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsidera-
tion. Dicta in Jones v. Carvell is in accord. See 641 P.2d at 
112. 
The classic dual functions of exemplary damages, i.e., 
to punish and to deter, are nowhere more needed than in a drunk 
driving context. There is simply no good reason for holding 
that Utah should revert to an "actual malice" standard in such 
cases. Plaintiffs conceded below that they could not prove 
actual malice in this case, since it is simply an arid 
conceptualism to suggest that a drunk driver could intend much 
of anything in his stupor. Plaintiffs would also urge the 
Court to reject awkward attempts to "imply malice" from earlier 
excessive consumption. A more straightforward approach is 
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simply to hold that "reckless disregard for the safety of 
others" can be the basis for punitive damage recovery. Such a 
holding would be in keeping with the holdings of Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. 
Isomy Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., supra, and most 
recently, Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d 
1106, 1112-1113 (Utah 1985). 
II. UNDER APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES, AN 
EMPLOYER MAY BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF THE 
CONDUCT OF ITS NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES. 
It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that the 
purpose of punitive damage awards is to provide a deterrent for 
the same or similar conduct and to punish the defendant for 
engaging in socially unacceptable behavior. See, e.g., Nash v. 
Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978). As such, where the 
objective of punishment and deterrence will be met thereby, 
punitive damages will be imposed upon an employer based upon 
the wrongful conduct of its employees. 
There are currently three standards that have been 
adopted by the courts for imposition of such liability. The 
most liberal rule applies a pure vicarious liability standard, 
and allows recovery of punitive damages from an employer based 
on its employee's conduct whenever the employer is liable for 
that same conduct in compensatory damages. Thus, where an 
employee's actions are in furtherance of its employer's inter-
ests and are within the course and scope of its employment, 
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both the employer and the employee will be answerable for any 
punitive damages that arise out of that conduct. This standard 
has been adopted by a number of jurisdictions, including 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and 
Tennessee. 
In rejecting the more conservative Restatement rule in 
favor of this liberal position, the Supreme Court of Oregon 
stated that the vicarious liability rule: 
Represents the better view with regard to 
the liability of a corporation for punitive 
damages, and is the only rule compatible 
with the court's prior statements that puni-
tive damages are justified as a deterrent to 
prevent the violation of societal interests. 
Stroud v. Denney's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 434, 532 P.2d 
790, 794 (1975). The court described the rule as follows: 
If the servant has committed a tort within 
the scope of his employment so as to render 
the corporation liable for compensatory 
damages, and if the servant's act is such as 
to render him liable for punitive damages, 
then the corporation is likewise liable for 
punitive damages. 
532 P.2d at 793. See also, Plaisance v. Yelder, 408 So.2d 136 
(Ala.Civ.App. 1981); Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 132 
Ariz. 498, 647 P.2d 629 (1982); Rickman v. Safeway Stores, 124 
Mont. 572, 227 P.2d 601 (1951); Kurn v. Radencic, 193 Okla. 
1126, 141 P.2d 580 (1943); Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania 
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Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243 (Pa.Super. 1983); J. Ghiardi and 
J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice, § 5.06 (1984), 
and other cases cited therein. . 
A number of other jurisdictions have applied a more 
conservative standard which is embodied by § 909 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and § 217C of the Restatement ^ 
(Second) of Agency. Under this standard, punitive damage 
recovery against an employer is allowed under the following 
circumstances: ^ 
Punitive damages can properly be awarded 
against a master or other principal because 
of an act by an agent if, but only if, 
(a) the principal or a managerial I 
agent authorized the doing and the manner of 
the act, or 
(b) the agent was unfit and the 
principal or a managerial agent was reckless 
in employing or retaining him, or I 
(c) the agent was employed in a 
managerial capacity and was acting in the 
scope of employment, or 
(d) the principal or a managerial I 
agent of the principal ratified or approved 
the act. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 909 (1979); Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 217C (1958). Under this rule, an employer | 
will be vicariously liable for punitive damages where the 
employee was a "managerial agent," where the employer autho-
rized, approved of or ratified the employee's conduct, or where j 
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the employer was reckless in employing or retaining an unfit 
servant. This position has also been endorsed by a number of 
jurisdictions, including California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Idaho, Illinois, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Iowa, and 
Kansas. See, J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law 
and Practice, § 5.07, and cases cited therein. 
The Florida Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals have taken yet another approach to this problem, 
adopting a standard which falls somewhere between the other 
two. Under this rule, an employer will be held vicariously 
liable for punitive damages if there is evidence of "some 
fault" on its part. The rule was first applied in Alexander v. 
Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 387 So.2d 422 (Fla.App. 1980), 
a case which is very similar factually to the present one. In 
that case, plaintiff's wife had been killed in an accident 
involving the defendant employer's truck while being driven by 
one of its employees when he was extremely intoxicated. Plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant employer, Alterman, "knew or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should have known" that its 
employee was not fit to drive on the day of the incident. The 
trial court had instructed the jury as follows: 
If you find the defendant, Alterman 
Transport Lines, Inc. knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have 
known that Charles E. Penley had a record 
for driving recklessly and carelessly or had 
a chronic drinking problem or was under the 
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influence of alcohol immediately prior to 
embarking on his work assignment, then you 
may find the defendant Alterman Transport 
Lines, Inc. liable for punitive damages to 
the plaintiff. 
I 
387 So.2d at 426. 
Alterman appealed the jury's award of punitive damages 
against it, arguing that such an award was dependent upon a 
finding that there was willful, wanton or outrageous conduct by 
the employer that was independent of such conduct by the 
employee, and that such an award could not be justified by 
evidence only of negligence. The appellate court disagreed, 
finding that the trial court's presentation of the punitive 
damage issue to the jury had been proper. 
Thus, the "some fault" rule allows recovery of puni-
tive damages against an employer for the willful and malicious 
conduct of its employee, absent a showing that the employer was 
independently willful and malicious, but only where there is 
some proof of culpability on the employer's part. This rule 
avoids the possibility of imposing punitive damages against an 
i 
employer where it was wholly without fault, and also promotes 
the policy of punitive damages by allowing their recovery where 
doing so will cause the employer to remedy its own fault and to 
take steps to deter such conduct by its employees thereafter. 
As such, the rule offers a compromise between the other two 
standards, and appears most likely to achieve an equitable 
result. 
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The reasoning of the court of appeals in Alexander was 
endorsed and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Mercury 
Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1981), also 
a case involving a death caused by the intoxicated condition of 
the defendant's employee while driving one of its vehicles. In 
that case, the court stated that punitive damages had been 
properly awarded against the employer in Alexander, since the 
plaintiffs in that case had alleged fault on the employer's 
part in negligently allowing its vehicle to be operated by an 
employee whom it should have known was intoxicated, and because 
the issue of fault had been determined by the jury. Finding no 
such allegation of fault in the case before it, the court 
reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages, holding 
that, although an employer may be vicariously liable for 
compensatory damages even if it was wholly without fault, it 
can only be vicariously liable for punitive damages where there 
is evidence of some fault on its part, stating: 
Before an employer may be held vicariously 
liable for punitive damages under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior, there must 
be some fault on his part. Although the 
misconduct of the employee, upon which the 
vicarious liability of the employer for 
punitive damages is based, must be willful 
and wanton, it is not necessary that the 
fault of the employer, independent of his 
employee's conduct, also be willful and 
wanton. It is sufficient that the plaintiff 
allege and prove some fault on the part of 
the employer which foreseeably contributed 
to the plaintiff's injury to make him 
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vicariously liable for punitive damages, 
(Emphasis added). 
393 So.2d at 549. The "some fault" standard was likewise 
recently adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Petrites v. Jake C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 
1981) and Dorsey v. Honda Motor Company, Ltd., 670 F.2d 21 (5th 
Cir. 1982). 
This Court has never decided what circumstances will 
justify an employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages 
in Utah. Plaintiffs submit that the most well-reasoned 
approach is embodied by the some fault standard, which elimi-
nates the potential for inequitable results inherent in the 
other two. However, plaintiffs also submit that the evidence 
in the record was more than sufficient to withstand summary 
judgment under any one of the three accepted standards. 
Plaintiffs were clearly entitled to judgment in their 
favor under the pure vicarious liability rule. In fact, NAC 
has admitted in these proceedings that defendant Rogers was 
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident. As such, NAC will be liable for any 
compensatory damages that are awarded to plaintiffs as a result 
of the accident, and under the pure vicarious liability rule, 
would also be liable for any punitive damages that are imposed. 
Likewise, an award of punitive damages under the some 
fault standard would be justified, since there is evidence that 
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NAC knewf or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, that defendant Rogers had a record for driving under the 
influence, had a chronic drinking problem and was under the 
influence of alcohol immediately prior to embarking on his work 
assignment. Proof of only one of these factors has been 
considered to be sufficient to justify vicarious liability for 
punitive damages under the some fault standard. See Alexander 
v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., supra. 
Defendant Rogers himself testified that he had been 
convicted of driving under the influence in Oregon prior to his 
employment by NAC. (Rogers, 10/3/84, p. 18, 11/1/82, p. 14). 
However, despite NAC's alleged "policy" of routinely running 
drivers1 license checks on its drivers, this previous convic-
tion either was not discovered or was ignored. Rogers testi-
fied that he was never even asked about it. (Rogers, 10/3/84, 
p. 18). That NAC did not in fact routinely run drivers' 
license checks on its employees is evidenced by the testimony 
of Augustine Moyer and David "Butch" Jacobson that, despite the 
fact that their drivers1 licenses were suspended by the state 
during their employment as drivers for NAC, NAC apparently 
never became aware of the suspensions, and they simply 
continued to drive. (Moyer, p. 10; Jacobson, pp. 6-7). In 
fact, Butch Jacobson testified that NAC only became aware of 
his license suspension after he was pulled over and arrested 
for driving on a suspended license. 
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NAC also knew or should have known that Don Rogers was 
seriously intoxicated on the night of the accident. Defendant 
Rogers testified that he consumed approximately seven vodka and 
orange juices and "a few beers" prior to reporting to work 
(Rogers, 11/1/82, pp. 39-40), and one of his co-employees 
testified that he additionally consumed a 27-ounce tequila 
drink, known as a "Raging Bull." (Kitchens, 10/3/84, pp. 
24-25, 33). NAC itself admitted, by its third party complaint 
against the bar at which Rogers had been drinking, that defen-
dant Rogers was "actually, apparently and obviously drunk" 
immediately prior to reporting for work. (Third Party 
Complaint, % 3). Nonetheless, NAC allowed defendant Rogers 
unrestricted use of a company vehicle. 
In fact, the testimony of NAC's drivers was that the 
company vehicles were made available to them without restric-
tion, in that they simply obtained keys from the garage and 
took the vehicles without even a cursory system for checking 
in. (Jacobson, p. 29; Moyer, pp. 22-23; Mann, 10/3/84, p. 
36). Moreover, there was testimony that neither the garage 
employees nor the dock employees had authority to prevent a 
night state driver from taking a vehicle even if they had 
believed he was intoxicated. (Moyer, pp. 17, 23; Mann, 
7/31/84, pp. 42-43). Apparently, Terry Northrup had exclusive 
control over the state drivers, and he was only on the NAC 
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premises at night approximately one or two times a month, 
(Mann, 7/31/84, p. 18). 
Finally, defendant Rogers testified that he was a 
"heavy drinker" for approximately six months to one year prior 
to his involvement in the accident, and that he really made no 
effort to hide his drinking habits from anyone. (Rogers, 
10/3/84, pp. 12, 20). One of defendant Rogers1 co-employees, 
Mike Mann, testified that he observed defendant Rogers to be 
intoxicated while at work approximately 25 times, that Rogers 
drank on the job and made no effort at all to hide it, and that 
Rogers usually had a bottle of Jack Daniels in his car which 
was parked in the dock area. (Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 26-27, 32). 
Another employee, Doug Kitchens, testified that he 
knew of 8-10 times when defendant Rogers went to work intoxi-
cated, and that he and a number of other NAC employees knew 
that Don Rogers was a heavy or problem drinker. (Kitchens, pp. 
11-12, 22). Augie Moyer testified that Don Rogers drank at 
work at least once a week, that he saw Rogers take beer with 
him on his runs, that when he saw Rogers drinking, "I'd say 50 
percent of the time he was intoxicated and then the other 50 
percent of the time he was gonna get there," and that it was 
"general knowledge" that Don Rogers drank on the job "because 
he didn't try to hide it at all." (Moyer, pp. 8, 14-15, 48). 
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Thus, there is ample evidence that NAC knew or should 
have known that defendant Rogers was not a suitable person to 
employ as a professional driver, that Rogers had a serious 
drinking problem for six months to one year prior to the 
accident, and regularly consumed alcohol and drugs both 
immediately before and during his working hours, and that 
Rogers was extremely intoxicated when he picked up the company 
vehicle on the night of the accident. Yet, NAC took no precau-
tions nor made any reasonable effort to prevent the operation 
of its vehicles by defendant Rogers or its other drivers while 
they were under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This 
evidence is more than sufficient to support an award of puni-
tive damages against NAC under the some fault standard. 
Finally, this same evidence likewise supports an award 
of punitive damages against NAC under even the most conserva-
tive vicarious liability standard. Evidence that Rogers had 
been previously convicted of driving under the influence, that 
he "drank heavily" for a period of six months to one year prior 
to his involvement in the accident and made no effort to hide 
his drinking habits, that he regularly reported to work in a 
state of intoxication and consumed both alcohol and marijuana 
during his working hours, a practice which he appeared to be 
casual about, and which was well known to, and easily 
observable by, other employees, could easily lead a jury to 
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determine that NAC was "reckless" in employing and retaining 
Rogers as a professional driver. Such a finding would be 
sufficient to support a punitive damages award under the 
Restatement rule. 
In fact, while the evidence tends to show that defen-
dant Rogers was an accident waiting to happen, NAC's defense is 
that he was a sterling employee, and that it had absolutely no 
reason to know that he engaged in any such behavior. Even if 
the jury were to believe this assertion, which is an assumption 
NAC is not entitled to have, NAC cannot avoid punitive damage 
liability by simply closing its eyes to those things which it 
has an obligation to look for, and by failing to take any 
reasonable measures to prevent what it should have known was 
likely to occur. In any event, the evidence tends to show that 
NAC knew or should have known that defendant Rogers was wholly 
unfit to be employed as a professional driver, and that NAC was 
thereby reckless in continuing to employ him in that position. 
There is also evidence that NAC had knowledge of, 
approved of, or ratified the conduct for which plaintiffs seek 
punitive damage recovery. The record is repleat with evidence 
that there was an ongoing pattern of drinking and drug usage by 
NAC's employees, both immediately before and during their 
working hours, that despite an alleged policy prohibiting 
drinking on the job, NAC allowed this practice to continue by 
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creating a situation in which supervision of night shift 
drivers was virtually non-existent and drivers were allowed to 
obtain company vehicles at their own discretion. In fact, 
supervision at night was so lax that the only thing which 
prevented Don Rogers from driving while intoxicated on at least 
two or three other occasions was his own intoxicated judgment 
that he should not report to work. (Rogers, 10/3/84, pp. 
24-25). Apparently, on the night of the accident, Mr. Rogers' 
judgment was in error. Moreover, on one occasion prior to the 
accident, defendant Rogers showed up approximately five hours 
late for work with several off-duty employees, after all of 
them had been drinking, and used a non-company vehicle to make 
the night run to Park City. (Gierloff, pp. 6-8). Night 
security was such that this conduct apparently never even came 
to the attention of management. 
The only effort that NAC made to prevent employee 
drinking and drug usage on the job was to adopt a written 
policy against such conduct which at some point was posted, 
along with various other "policies," in an office on the 
premises, and which was allegedly signed by each employee upon 
his hiring. However, the testimony suggests that it was common 
sense, rather than the existence of a company policy, that told 
the employees that such conduct was prohibited. (Moyer, pp. 
33-34; Christensen, p. 34). In fact, the practice of drinking 
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and using drugs at work was so common that even those NAC 
employees that did not participate in it testified that office 
gossip about it was fairly widespread and consistent for 
several months prior to the accident, (Gierloff, pp. 24-26) , 
and those employees that did participate in it were of the 
opinion that Terry Northrup, and perhaps other NAC management 
persons, had to have been aware of its existence. (Kitchens, 
p. 19; Jacobson, pp. 31-32, 47). In addition, Mike Mann and 
Augie Moyer testified that the company rule against drinking 
simply "was not enforced" (Mann, 7/31/84, p. 88; Moyer, p. 28), 
and there was testimony that the practice of drinking and drug 
usage on the job was "common knowledge," and that it was some-
thing that would not have been very difficult for anyone to 
have discovered if they had made any effort to do so. (Mann, 
pp. 34, 88-89; Gierloff, pp. 24-28). Despite this, NAC failed 
to take any reasonable steps to prevent such conduct. 
In Torres v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 135 Ariz. 
35, 658 P.2d 835 (Ct.App. 1982), the Arizona Court of Appeals 
found a similar failure by an employer to be an appropriate 
independent basis for an award of punitive damages against the 
employer, although that jurisdiction endorses the most liberal 
vicarious liability rule. In that case, the plaintiff's 
husband had been killed by a North American employee when the 
tractor trailer he was driving left the road and struck a 
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parked vehicle at a high rate of speed. The evidence showed 
that the accident was caused by the driver's fatigue, which was 
in turn caused by his driving in excess of the legally allow-
able amount of time. The excess driving had been made possible 
by the employee's falsification of his driving log, and by the 
employer's failure to take any reasonable measures to prevent 
it. Liability for punitive damages was based upon both a 
respondeat superior theory and on the theory that the 
employer's "corporate safety policies constituted a wanton 
disregard for the safety of the public." 658 P.2d at 837. The 
court affirmed the punitive damage award, stressing that it 
would have not been difficult for the employer to have set up a 
system that would have prevented log falsification by its 
drivers, stating: 
North American's failure to monitor the logs 
through an appropriate log verification 
procedure when it had the equipment and 
personnel to do it expeditiously and without 
too much additional cost permitted the 
practice of filing false logs. The company 
also took no measures, despite the facili-
ties to do so, to establish a proper control 
of driving time while the drivers v/ere 
enroute. It should have known that its 
failure to enforce the 70-hour rule could 
result in sloppy logging of on-duty time 
with the concommitant risk of exceeding the 
time limitation, thus causing fatigue. 
Submission of the punitive damages issue to 
the jury was proper. 
658 P.2d at 839. NAC exhibited a similar disregard for the 
public's safety by failing to establish proper control of its 
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drivers, despite its knowledge or constructive knowledge of an 
ongoing problem, and plaintiffs are likewise entitled to have a 
jury determine the issue of NAC's liability for punitive 
damages. 
Finally/ there is also evidence that NAC had actual 
knowledge of the drinking and drug usage, and in fact condoned 
it. There was testimony that some of the drivers periodically 
took other employees, non-employees and alcohol with them when 
they made night runs to Evanston. During one of these outings, 
Augie Moyer ran a company vehicle off the road and had to 
actually steal another vehicle in order to get back to Salt 
Lake City. (Jacobson, pp. 36-38). Sometime thereafter, 
Mr. Northrup told an employee that he knew about the van 
incident and the girls, and an inference could be raised that 
he also knew about the alcohol. (Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 45-47). 
Nonetheless, Mr. Northrup imposed absolutely no sanctions on 
Mr. Moyer for such conduct, thereby creating the impression 
that he did not disapprove of it. 
On one occasion, Mr. Northrup observed Augie Moyer and 
Butch Jacobson smoking marijuana during their working hours and 
told them that "if you're gonna do it, do it while you're on 
the road and not in the docks." (Jacobson, pp. 21-22). Those 
employees were not sanctioned in any other way for their 
conduct. Moreover, on at least one occasion, Mr. Northrup 
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himself came to work at night intoxicated to the point that the 
employees who observed him stated that his speech was slurred 
and that he almost wrecked the motorcycle on which he was 
riding. (Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 34-40; Jacobson, p. 23; Moyer, pp. 
51-53). Finally, sometime prior to the accident, Mr. Northrup 
had a "jungle juice" party for NAC employees at his home, at 
which there was a high alcohol content drink served and 
marijuana was smoked. (Jacobson, pp. 23-24). At least some of 
the employees that were drinking and smoking marijuana at that 
party were expected to report to work that evening. (Jacobson, 
p. 25). 
Thus, there is ample evidence to justify imposition of 
punitive damages against NAC under even the most conservative 
vicarious liability standard. In fact, other courts have held 
that evidence of similar conduct by employers would be 
sufficient to satisfy the restrictive Restatement rule. For 
example, in Bryner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 868 (Iowa 1983), 
the Iowa Supreme Court recently held that, even under the most 
restrictive rule, evidence of an "utter lack of supervision, 
coupled with disregard for the action of the employees is 
sufficient evidence to make a jury question of whether it [the 
employer] authorized the doing and the manner of driving in 
question." Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court recently stated 
that the Restatement rule would be satisfied by evidence that 
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the employer was "reckless in the training of its employees 
regarding safety precautions." Kline v. Multi-Media Cable 
Vision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 993, 666 P.2d 711, 716 (1983). 
There can be no question but that there is evidence in the 
present case that supports the claim that NAC's lack of super-
vision and failure to adopt reasonable safety precautions are 
sufficient to satisfy even the most restrictive rule of 
corporate liability for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Punitive damages may be awarded in an action for 
wrongful death in Utah where the defendant's conduct is indica-
tive of a "reckless indifference" to the rights of others, and 
a plaintiff need not show actual malice in order to recover. 
In this case, the record is more than sufficient to create a 
material issue of fact with respect to such reckless indif-
ference by each of the defendants, and the trial court's entry 
of partial summary judgment in their favor on that issue was in 
error. 
Moreover, even assuming that plaintiffs cannot ulti-
mately prove the existence of independent reckless indifference 
by NAC, there will still be an issue with respect to their 
right to recover punitive damages from NAC under the theory of 
vicarious liability, in the event that defendant Rogers is 
found to have been himself recklessly indifferent. There is 
-33-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
sufficient evidence in the record to support a vicarious award 
of punitive damages against NAC under any one of the three most 
commonly accepted theories of vicarious liability. The trial 
court's outright rejection of the concept of vicarious liabil-
ity for punitive damages was wholly without precedential 
support, and is in conflict with the general policies that are 
applicable to punitive damage recovery in general,. The deci-
sion must therefore be reversed. 
DATED this ~2tf day of October, 1985. 
L 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
<*2AJY^ 
'j» P ULbh 
WEBB 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RAY C. JOHNSON, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD ROGERS, et al., 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-82-5331 
This action arises out of an automobile/pedestrian accident 
which resulted in the death of plaintiff's decedent, a small 
child. 
The following depositions have been opened and published: 
Deponent Dated 
Donald Rogers November 1, 1982 
Ray L. Johnson November 1, 1982 
Frances C. Johnson November 1, 1982 
Wallace M. Curry March 8, 1984 
Michael Carl Mann July 31, 1984 
Larry Saracino October 3, 1984 
Donald Rogers October 3, 1984 
Douglas K. Kitchens October 3, 1984 
Cheryl Gierloff October 3, 1984 
EXHIBIT A 
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JOHNSON V. ROGERS PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Construing the facts in favor of the plaintiffs, it appears 
that defendant Rogers was employed by defendant NAC as a driver. 
He would pick newspapers up at the NAC office between Regent 
Street and Main Street in Salt Lake City, and deliver them throughout 
the state. On the evening in question Rogers decided to return 
to the NAC garage and pick up a coat from his personal vehicle. 
While enroute, the accident occurred. 
By his own admission Rogers had been drinking alcoholic 
beverages throughout the day of the accident. At the time of 
the accident his blood/alcohol level was well above the statutory 
limit. 
There is evidence that prior to the accident employees 
holding positions similar to Rogers and Rogers himself reported 
to work at NAC while intoxicated. Other evidence indicates 
that on one occasion a supervisor for NAC told another driver 
not to smoke marijuana at the loading dock, but that he should 
wait until he was "out on the road." Additional evidence indicates 
that the NAC drivers took alcoholic beverages with them on their 
routes in ice chests. Construing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, it would appear that the management 
of NAC knew or should have known of this conduct. Lastly, the 
evidence indicates that Rogers had moved to Utah after residing 
in another state where his license had been revoked. NAC prior 
to hiring Rogers failed to detect this fact. 
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JOHNSON V. ROGERS PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiffs seek punitive damages from NAC on two theories. 
The first is that NAC is vicariously liable for punitive damages* 
Plaintiffs claim that Rogers' conduct was so egregious that 
punitive damages should be assessed against him and passed on 
to the principal NAC on the theory of agency. This theory is 
without merit. To so hold would expose every principal or employer 
to liability for punitive damages regardless of how careful 
the employer was in hiring and retaining its employees. The 
purpose of punitive damages is two-fold. Such damages are to 
punish wrongdoers and secondly to serve as a healthy warning 
to others not to offend in a like manner. Nash v. Craigco, 
Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978). 
The first purpose would not be accomplished by holding 
an innocent employer liable for punitive damage since there 
is no wrong doing on the part of the employer. The employer 
would be punished only for hiring the wrong employee. Likewise 
the second purpose would be frustrated since it would serve 
as a warning to other employers not to hire anyone. The careful, 
prudent and reasonable employer would be subjected to liability 
for punitive damages on the basis of happenstance alone. One 
might argue that this occurs in situations where the negligence 
of an agent is imputed to the principal. The difference is 
that in those situations the imputation of negligence is based 
on the agency principal that allows for vicarious liability 
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JOHNSON V. ROGERS PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
on the basis that the agent by his conduct is furthering the 
business of the principal. Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, 271 
Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975). The agent however who conducts 
himself in a manner so as to subject himself to punitive damages 
cannot be said to be furthering the business interests of the 
principal. Stone v. Hurst Lumber, 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910 
(1963). 
It might be argued also that if the employer condones the 
wrongful facts of the employee, the above rationale wouldn't 
hold true. Campen v. Stone, 635 P. 2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981). Alleging 
that the employer condoned or encouraged the wrongful actions 
of the employer is just another way of alleging that the employer 
wrongfully hired or retained the employee. 
This brings the Court to plaintffs' second theory which 
is that NAC is liable directly for its own conduct in either 
wrongfully hiring or retaining Rogers in employment. 
Plaintiffs allege that NAC was so derelect in these practices 
that punitive damages should be assessed. Several memoranda 
have been submitted to the Court, yet no Utah cases have been 
cited to the Court which bear on this issue directly. The issue 
is what type of conduct gives rise to a claim for punitive damages. 
The Utah Supreme Court in several cases has given some 
guidance, however, in this area. In the case of McFarland v. Skaggs, 
678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), the court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JOHNSON V. ROGERS PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Accordingly, we adopt as the appropriate 
standard for determining the availability 
of a punitive damage award in an action 
for false imprisonment that of "malice in 
fact" or "actual malice." Furthermore, 
in the instant case, it follows that the 
requisite finding of "actual malice" cannot 
be implied from the absence of probable 
cause in effecting the arrest. 
678 P.2d 304 
The Utah Supreme Court in so ruling held that there must 
be "malice in fact" or "actual malice" to sustain a claim for 
punitive damages. 
"Actual malice" or "malice in fact" has been defined as 
willful and malicious misconduct. See, Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Mercantile Institution, 605 P. 2d 314 (Utah 1979). Although 
Terry v. ZCMI , supra, was overruled in part, the definitions 
of "actual malice" or "malice in fact" is still the law of Utah. 
In a footnote in McFarland, supra, the Utah Supreme Court cited 
with approval Gilmer v. Playboy Club of Denver, Inc., 513 P.2d 
1065 (Colo.App. 1973) which defines "malice in fact" or "actual 
malice" as an act done with evil intent and with the purpose 
of injuring. 
It would appear the focus of the inquiry is not to determine 
the conduct of the offending party, but rather the intent or 
state of mind of the offending party. Support for this proposition 
is found in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co v. Isom, 657 P.2d 
293 (Utah 1982) . That case called upon the Utah Supreme Court 
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JOHNSON V. ROGERS PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
to determine when punit ive damages could be assessed in a case 
i n v o l v i n g i n t e n t i o n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e s with a contract . In i t s 
dec i s ion the court d i s c u s s e d the i s s u e of "improper purpose" 
and the court s t a t e d : 
The a l t e r n a t i v e of improper purpose w i l l 
support a cause of a c t i o n for i n t e n t i o n a l 
inteference with prospect ive economic re la t ions 
even where defendants means were proper. 
657 P.2d at 307. 
The court also quoted from a treatise: 
Since Lumley v. Gye there has been general 
agreement that a purely "malicious" motive, 
in the sense of spite and a desire to do 
harm to the plaintiff for its own sake, 
will make the defendant liable for interference 
with a contract. The same is true of a 
mere officious intermeddling for no other 
reason than a desire to interefere. On 
the other hand, in the few cases in which 
the question has arisen, it has been held 
that where the defendant has a proper purpose 
in view, the addition of ill will toward 
the plaintiff will not defeat his privilege. 
It may be suggested that here, as in the 
case of mixed motives in the exercise of 
a privilege in defamation and malicious 
prosecution, the court may well look to 
the predominant purpose underlying the defen-
dant1 s conduct. [Citations omitted; emphasis 
added.] W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law 
of Torts, Section 129 at 943 (4th ed. 1971) 
It appears from these cases that the focus of the inquiry 
is not the conduct of the defendant, but the state of mind of 
the defendant. If the defendant did not act with evil intent 
and with the purpose of injuring then there is no "actual malice" 
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or "malice in fact" and a claim for punitive damages cannot 
be sustained. 
The only way to prove the intent or state of mind of an 
individual is to review the covert actions of that person. 
The trier of fact may then, from those facts infer what the 
state of mind or intent of the individual was at the time in 
question. The inference must be a reasonable one. After a 
review of all the evidence presented, this Court holds that 
the minds of reasonable men could not differ and reasonable 
men would have to conclude that there was no intent on the part 
of NAC to injure anyone, nor did NAC act with an evil intent. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue 
of any material fact and therefore NAC's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
Dated this rQ 5 day of March, 1985. 
/*/ PULj &/Jh) 
PHILIP R. FISfiLER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this Q,t> day of March, 1985: 
/Gordon L. Roberts 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
185 S. State, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
100 Commercial Club Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward J. McDonough 
170 S. Main, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Lowell V, Smith 
650 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
P. Keith Nelson 
50 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Robert H. Henderson 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RAY C. JOHNSON and 
FRANCES C. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD ROGERS and NEWSPAPER 
AGENCY CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BETWEEN FRIENDS, a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party 
Defendant 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES AS TO DEFENDANTS 
ROGERS AND NEWSPAPER 
AGENCY CORPORATION 
Civil No. C-82-5331 
Judge Philip R. Fishier 
* * * * * * * * 
Defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation and defendant; 
Donald Rogers having moved separately for partial summary] 
EXHIBIT B Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, U.R.C.P., on the subject of! 
punitive damages, and the Court having received extensive' 
I 
briefing and oral argument on the subject of punitive damages; 
I 
and the subject of vicarious liability for punitive damages,1 
each of the parties having been represented by their counsel of 
record in these arguments, and good cause appearing therefor, i 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that partial summary judgment: 
should be and the same hereby is granted in favor of defendant 
Donald Rogers and Defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation and 
against plaintiffs Ray C. Johnson and Frances c. Johnson to the1 
effect that punitive damages are not recoverable in this action. 
against either of those defendants. In making this ruling, the| 
i 
Court has made and relied upon the following legal rulings: 
1. The Court finds that to recover punitive damages 
in the State of Utah the plaintiff must establish actual1 
i 
malice. See McFarland v. Skaggs, 678 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1984) i 
(overruling Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 605; 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), and impliedly overruling 3ranch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., 675 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982), Leigh) 
i 
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), and! 
i 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah' 
1983)). 
2. The Court further finds and relies upon the; 
finding that as a matter of law there is no vicarious^ liability 
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i 
for punitive damages in Utah—that is, in order to find an 
employer liable for punitive damages, it is necessary for the 
plaintiff to establish that the employer itself, through 
responsible management employees, is guilty of malice. 
3. The Court further finds that, as a matter of 
fact, there was no malice on the part of either defendant 
Rogers or defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation. 
DATED this day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to Form; 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
PHILIP/Rr. FISHLER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HiNDLEY 
CLERK 
Bv K C\X.\?f}<;) 
Deputy die 
 Cl rk 
P. KEITH NELSON 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
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